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Lock ’em Up?
A few years ago, when my son was 12 years old, he painted on a wall at a public school. He got caught immediately, confessed his guilt, and after serving 52 hours community service, paying restitution, taking a victims rights class, and staying out of trouble for six months his suspended sentence was expunged. To this day he can barely talk about it because the mortification is overwhelming. Someday he will probably be able to acknowledge that the whole experience made him a better person–he became far more responsible, and to this day he is the most empathetic teenager I have ever known.
I have been thinking about that experience a lot lately as I read about the “campus sexual assault crisis” and the various dramas at universities trying to deal with the intersection of young adults, alcohol, sexual freedom, predatory behavior, bro culture, and on and on and on. I will not wade into the question of whether there really is a sexual assault crisis on America’s university campuses or whether we have redefined sexual assault down to incorporate normal behavior–I don’t know nearly enough about the data or the methodologies to even have a valid opinion.
What has struck me instead is the disconnect between my son’s experience and the experience of young men on college campuses accused of sexual assault. The question that nags at me is, why are colleges dealing with the aftermath of sexual assault allegations at all? Certainly universities are responsible for the environments they create. They are responsible for policies about on-campus behavior that foster a safe learning and living environment. The ways that they deal with sponsored activities, Greek culture, athletic teams, and alcohol in dorms are all matters for open and probing discussion–prevention is their business. Investigation and prosecution are not. Or they should not be.
In today’s New York Times, Jennifer Weiner leans heavily on the idea that justice is applied to young men disproportionately based on race, and that is no doubt true, but my son’s case indicates it is not the only variable. He was an upper middle-class white kid standing before a judge facing a possible one year jail sentence when he was twelve–for painting on a wall. Why are universities adjudicating allegations of serious crimes in any way except to refer them to legal authorities?
I have a hypothesis, but I’m not sure how you would test it. Public K-12 schools are mandated government institutions. They are battling budget pressures, ever growing and shifting mandates, demanding parents, neglectful parents. They have a legal obligation to take just about every kid and provide a vast array of services. If they are too lenient with trouble-makers they face public backlash from parents whose kids suffer. If they are too harsh, they face public backlash from privileged parents, activist parents, the press, etc. I challenge you to find a public school teacher who does not have a story about some parent whose child could do no wrong and who made it his or her life’s mission to coach the teacher in the proper care and handling of the little darling. Trying to mete out discipline in such an environment is an invitation to angry parents, public accusations in the press, and even litigation. There’s not much upside except for the proper development of our children. I suspect most educators would prefer to handle discipline issues rationally but not at the risk of their jobs, their pensions, and their reputations.
Universities are operating in a different environment. In The Death of Expertise Tom Nichols delivers an impassioned but convincing argument against the idea of the student as consumer. In a nation of vastly expanded higher education options, universities compete ruthlessly for the best students. As budgets shrink, public universities are under ever-increasing pressure for tuition, grants, donations, and incidental income. The results have not been good–excessive spending on administration and amenities, inappropriate deference to students’ feelings and prejudices, an erosion of the authority relationship between students and faculty, just for starters. In that environment, schools are walking a tightrope on sexual assault allegations. Do too little and you risk an explosive scandal and substantial liability. That danger would seem to motivate the sort of maximalist approach we see in the public K-12 schools, but there is an additional variable. Public prosecution will put your university in the news, and not in a good way. How many of those helicopter parents who drove the 10th grade English teacher crazy will choose not to send their little darling off to Big State U as a result of a highly publicized sexual assault trial? We know that human beings in general are not very good at assessing risk. We know they are even worse at it when the news media distorts their perceptions by fixating on certain telegenic (but not very common) crimes. I can attest personally that parents are inclined to vastly overestimate risk to their children–it’s part of why we have survived as a species. Parents are not well equipped to evaluate or even gather the evidence regarding variable sexual assault risk between universities. One spectacular trial could constitute a public relations and recruiting disaster.
I suspect the dynamic above accounts for at least some of the inequity we see in treatment of discipline issues between various levels of education. Universities have a perverse incentive to quiet accusations while taking sufficient action to inoculate themselves from litigation and scandal. The risk of scandal from doing too little is greater than the risk of scandal from denying due process to the accused. Universities’ tradition (now largely defunct) of acting in loco parentis provides a framework and a level of comfort with the in-house disciplinary approach. That is all understandable, but it is not the proper solution. If we want to protect students from sexual assault (and other serious crimes) and ensure the due process rights of students, who after all are almost all legal adults, then we should subject them to the same criminal justice system that would apply if they did not pay $25,000 tuition and ace the SAT. Treat alleged sexual assault by a 20-year-old with at least the same seriousness we apply to minor vandalism by a 12-year-old.
Review – Postwar by Tony Judt
Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 by Tony Judt.
Paperback, 960 pages. Published September 5, 2006 by Penguin Books. ISBN: 978-0143037750
Tony Judt’s Postwar is the sort of book that makes me question my life–how can I know and understand so little when there are people on this earth who can weave obscure Polish philosophers, Soviet dissidents, French intellectuals, British trade unionists and a thousand other bits of data into a coherent, engaging narrative that stretches from 1945 to 2005, from Moscow to Dublin and Norway to Greece? And yet Judt managed just that, albeit delving far more deeply into some countries (France and Czechoslovakia for instance) than others (Ireland and Spain).
Judt sees the forces that have shaped Europe since 1945 as an almost endless series of binary confrontations even as he makes the point that these binaries are false. The most obvious is free-market capitalism versus Soviet Communism, but Judt makes it clear how much of the “free market” was enmeshed with government ownership and economic manipulation, and just how often the various eastern bloc countries permitted free market inroads to stave off total collapse. Judt can acknowledge the cruelties of unfettered capitalism–and his treatment of Margaret Thatcher is notable for its heat–while condemning Soviet Communism and its many satellites for their boundless repression. Indeed, he reserved some of his harsher criticism for the various western European Communists who found it impossible to acknowledge even Stalin’s crimes, let alone the generalized repression and economic failure of the Soviet Union, until long after they were apparent to any reasonable observer.
Postwar makes it clear that history does not unfold as a sporting event, with one winner, one loser, and a clean result. In the introduction he makes the initially jarring claim that, “since 1989 it has become clearer than it was before just how much the stability of post-war Europe rested upon the accomplishments of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler.” (9) “Accomplishments” was surely intended to provoke when applied to history’s greatest tyrants, but Judt makes it clear that he means exactly that. Hitler and Stalin both, to varying degrees, sought to sort out the humanity under their control into homogeneous packets, and both succeeded largely in doing so. While the postwar world condemned what later came to be known as “ethnic cleansing,” it did not reverse it. If anything, the victorious allies extended it through the expulsion of Germans from Western Poland and Czechoslovakia and the failure to fully restore the surviving Jews to their homes and property. The resulting countries could pursue “national” goals in ways that would have been difficult or impossible in the multicultural states that preceded the war.
Moreover the European Union rests on foundations laid by Napoleon in his Continental System and vastly expanded by the Nazis to realize their vision of a continental reich. Vichy administrator Pierre Pucheu’s vision for a free market with a shared currency stemmed from frustrating experiences of economic policy planning between the world wars and was shared by Albert Speer and others. By conquering most of the continent and assimilating it into the German Reich, Hitler effectively achieved a common market without borders and sharing the Reichsmark as its currency. Consequently, postwar bureaucrats had experience with something similar to the eventual European Economic Community and European Union–it was not unimaginable because the Nazis had made it happen.
Needless to say the European Union’s core values are the antithesis of and reaction against Nazi ideology, and consequently few if any Europeans want to ascribe their liberal, multicultural superstate to its Nazi forebears. The willful forgetting of the EU’s historical antecedents is but one of the many ways in which parties, nations, and the entire continent of Europe have intentionally obscured and distorted history to form foundation myths and avoid the clashes that come with acknowledging past wrongs. The French mythmaking surrounding wartime collaboration and resistance is well-documented, but Judt dives deeply into the similar process in the occupied western European states, the neutral states, and the occupied states that fell behind the Iron Curtain. He documents the fundamental differences between postwar Britain, which never suffered occupation and can therefore take a purist attitude toward collaboration, and France, Belgium, the Netherlands, et. al. who collaborated to greater or lesser degrees out of necessity. In the east he contrasts the experience of Yugoslavia, which alone could claim a history of fierce resistance to the Nazis (while obscuring and suppressing the internal murder and conflict that required) with nations under the Soviet thumb that ascribed wartime crimes and collaboration to capitalist governments and thereby disavowed all responsibility.
No review would be complete without noting the extent to which Judt foreshadowed Brexit and the centrifugal forces that are roiling Europe today. Reading this book in light of recent developments, one must acknowledge in every section on Britain and its relations with the continental powers that British membership in the larger European experiment was always awkward and contingent. Britain stood apart from the continent before the war, and its greater integration since has often been more window dressing than reality. Britain’s socialism was different from continental socialism–older and more union-focused–and therefore less resilient in the face of economic integration. Ironically, Thatcherite privatization made Britain more vulnerable still. Its social safety net was thinner, its institutions more brittle, and its workers had already taken a significant hit as inefficient industries collapsed or departed. No reader of Postwar should have been surprised at the Brexit vote. France is a different story. Judt, writing before 1999, sees the National Front as an insignificant fringe. He cites Jean-Marie LePen repeatedly as an example of the ineffective far right. No doubt he would be surprised to see LePen’s daughter contending seriously for the presidency of the republic, even though she had to jettison her father and his baggage to make it possible.
At more than 800 pages of text, Postwar is a serious undertaking, but it is not dry or boring, and the narrative remains as engaging on Foucault and Derrida’s influence on the French left as on the blindness and stupidity of Serbian nationalists. Judt’s premature death in 2010 deprived us of a premier public intellectual.
Review – Alexander Hamilton by Ron Chernow
Alexander Hamilton by Ron Chernow
Kindle Edition, 860 pages. Published March 29, 2005 by Penguin Books. ASIN: B000QJLQZI
These are notes for a review of Ron Chernow’s excellent biography of Alexander Hamilton. Beginning in my last Afghanistan tour, I became interested in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy. What did the founders really think, and how did they act. I had an embarrassingly weak grasp on the early years of our republic and reading time on my hands. I’m not sure why I never completed the Chernow review–perhaps it coincided with my redeployment and I just got busy. At any rate, here are the notes, and I will endeavor to flesh them out if I get the time.
Hagiography
hostile and unfair to Madison
Not as much speculation as Madison and Washington biographies, but still too much–especially as it pertains to his relations with Eliza.
Decline as he aged. More conservative, more fearful.
Gouvernor Morris’s odd post-mortem claim that H favored monarchism
Interesting parallels to D.P Moynihan (October Atlantic)
Comparison to Reagan Democrats–baby boomers for revolution in their youth who transition to reflexive conservatism in their middle age.
Clear effects of the personal losses he suffered on his outlook. Chernow’s claims regarding whether H was or was not suicidal are highly suspect.
Ultimately, Chernow is reluctant to admit that Hamilton after 40 was not Hamilton before 40. He became a less important, less bold, and ultimately less effective leader as he took greater council of his fears. Given a largely free rein by Washington, he operated boldly and brilliantly. Challenged and distrusted by Adams, out of government (mostly), and with most of his grandest ideas implemented, he slipped into partisanship for the sake of partisanship and personal animosity. Emphasize the 18th C party as cult of personality.